[Crm-sig] Issue: E89 Propositional Object and Symbolic Object

João Oliveira joaoli13 at gmail.com
Tue Apr 29 14:56:14 EEST 2008


Dear Guenther Goerz,

>> - what is the meaning of "concept" in the middle of the triangle?  >> -
Do you understand by "concept" anything different from what Frege meant by
concepts as results of abstraction?

    The first diagram, known as "Triangle of Concept", is a reproduction of
the diagram created by Ingetraut Dahlberg in "Ontical Structures and
Universal Classification, 1978, Bangalore: Sarada Ranganathan Endowment for
Library Science, pg. 13". This diagram could also be found in "A
Referent-Oriented, Analytical Concept Theory for INTERCONCEPT."
(International Classification. 5:3, pp.142-151).

    According Dahlberg, a "scientific concept" is a "a knowledge unit
synthesizing the characteristics of a stated item of reference by a term or
a name"; a "general scientific concept" is a "a scientific concept which
synthesizes the necessary characteristics only"; and a "individual
scientific concept" is a "a scientific concept which synthesizes necessary
and accidental characteristics". I think Dahlberg's definitions for
"concept" is broader than Frege's definitions because she also considers
individuals (particulars).

 >> - what is a "true predication"?
>> Are there also "false" predications, and if so, what are they?
 >> If you talk about predication, do you need a theory of truth in advance?


    According Dahlberg, "true predications" are "verifiable statements on
their items of reference" (1978a, p. 14). Considering the Principle of
Bipolarity (which Wittgenstein was the first to adopt), every proposition
must be capable of being true and capable of being false. Only the "true"
propositions points to the item of reference.

Best regards,

Joao Lima





On Tue, Apr 29, 2008 at 5:49 AM, Guenther Goerz <guenther.goerz at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Dear all,
> just two brief questions about the first diagram:
> - what is a "true predication"?  Are there also "false" predications, and
> if so, what are they?  If you talk about predication, do you need a theory
> of truth in advance?
> - what is the meaning of "concept" in the middle of the triangle? Do you
> understand by "concept" anything different from what Frege meant by concepts
> as results of abstraction?
>
> Best regards,
> -- Guenther Goerz
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof. Dr. Guenther Goerz            Fon: (+49 9131) 852-8701; -8702
> Univ. Erlangen-Nuernberg            Fax: (+49 9131) 852-8986
> Institut f. Informatik 8/KI         goerz  AT informatik.uni-erlangen.de
> Haberstrasse 2                      ggoerz AT csli.stanford.edu
> D-91058 ERLANGEN
>                http://www8.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/inf8/en/goerz.html
>
>
>
>   On Fri, Apr 25, 2008 at 11:03 PM, João Oliveira <joaoli13 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> >    Dear Martin,
> >
> >     Attached my contribution to the Propositional Object and Symbolic
> > Object discussion.
> >
> >     I've created a modified version {Slide 4} of your graph.
> >     Basically, the differences could be summarized as:
> >
> >   (a) A new property definition:
> >          [ E89 Propositional Object ] Rxx is realized in (realizes) [
> > E90 Symbolic Object ]
> >       with quantification '(1,1:1,1) necessary dependent';
> >   (a.1) A new subproperty definition:
> >          [ R15 is realized in (realizes) ] isA [ Rxx is realized in
> > (realizes)];
> >   (a.2) Exclusion of one E89 subclass declaration:
> >          [ E73 Information Object ] isA [ E89 Propositional Object];
> >   (a.3) A new class definition: "Fnn Self Contained Individual Work"
> >   (a.3.1) A new subproperty definition: [ F15 Individual Work ] Ryy has
> > component (is component of) [ Fnn Self Contained Individual Work ].
> >
> >   (b) Exclusion of one subproperty declaration:
> >          [ P129 is about (is subject of) ] isA [ P67 refers to (is
> > referred to by) ];
> >   (b.1) Modification of P67 property domain:
> >          from [ E89 Propositional Object ] to [ E90 Symbolic Object ];
> >
> >   (c) Modification of R5 superproperty:
> >         from [ P148 has component (is component of) ]
> >         to [ P106 is composed of (forms parts of) ]
> >
> > Regarding (a), (a.1), (a.2), (a.3) and (a.3.1):
> > ===============================
> >     The idea to define a "realizes" property between propositional and
> > symbolic objects and to remove the subclass declaration between "E73
> > Information Object" and "E89 Propositional Object" are based on Theory of
> > Concept (Ingetraut Dahlberg, 1978), on Smiraglia's analogy of Works and Sign
> > (Semiotic), and on the R15 property definition of FRBRoo.
> >
> >     To Dahlberg, a concept (that could represent universals and
> > individuals) has three components {ppt file - Slide 1}:
> > (1) the Item of Reference (IR);
> > (2) the set of true predications about IR;
> > (3) and the synthesis of "true predications about IR" by a term/a name.
> >
> >     In CIDOC CRM terms, we could make an analogy as: E1 Entity (as IR);
> > E89 Propositional Object (as set of true predications about IR); and E90
> > Symbolic Object (as the synthesis of "true predications about IR" by a
> > term/a name) {ppt file - Slide 2}.
> >
> >     An example that relates instances of "E31 Document", "F15 Individual
> > Work" and "F22 Self Contained Expression " classes is presented at { Slide 3
> > }.
> >     This analogy between Work and Dalhberg's Concept definition is
> > similar to the analogy of Work and Sign (Semiotic) that was realized by
> > Smiraglia in the paper "Musical Works as Information Retrieval Entities:
> > Epistemological Perspectives"):
> >
> > ////////////// start of Smiraglia's quote
> > "A work is a signifying, concrete set of ideational conceptions that
> > finds realization through semantic or symbolic expression. That is, a work
> > embraces a set of ideas that constitute both the conceptual (signified) and
> > image (signifier) components of a sign. A work functions in society in the
> > same manner that a sign functions in language. Works, like signs,
> > demonstrate the characteristics of arbitrariness (the absence of a natural
> > link between the signified and the signifier) and linearity (signifiers
> > unfold sequentially over time). Therefore, works are subject to the natural
> > ambiguity of signs, having
> > both the properties of immutability (the fixed nature of a signifier in
> > a given community) and mutability (change over time in their perception and
> > use)."
> > ////////////// end of Smiraglia's quote
> >
> >
> > Regarding (b, and b.1):
> > =================
> >
> >      To justify the modifications (b) and (b.1), I'll make argumetations
> > based on Wittgenstein (First W. - in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) TLP
> > propositions and I'll show one example of Patrick Wilson's "Two Kinds of
> > Power" about "aboutness" and "reference".
> >      In the (First) Wittgenstein we can find the following propositions
> > about proposition, expression, names and sense.
> >
> > /////////////// start of Wittgenstein's quote
> > (3)    A logical picture of facts is a thought.
> > (3.1)  In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be
> > perceived by the senses.
> > (3.11) We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written,
> > etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is
> > to think of the sense of proposition.
> > (3.142) Only fact can express a sense, a set of names cannot.
> > (3.143) Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obscured by the
> > usual form of expression in writing or print. For in a printed proposition,
> > for example, no essential difference is apparent between a propositional
> > sign and a word.
> > (3.144) Situations can be described but not given names. (Names are like
> > points; propositions like arrows - they have sense)
> > (3.3)  Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition
> > does a name have meaning",
> > (3.4)  A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence
> > of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere existence of the
> > constituents - by the existence of the proposition with a sense."
> > /////////////// end of Wittgenstein's quote
> >       Different from Frege, Wittgenstein consider that names don't
> > express sense (3.142) and  only "in the nexus of a proposition does a name
> > have meaning" (3.3). It's important to perceive that meaning is different
> > from sense ( 3.144 ... "Names are like points; propositions like arrows -
> > they have sense").
> >
> >     In FRBRoo terms, I think that F2 Expression (like a symbolic object)
> > doesn't have sense (aboutness, intentionality). But it's possible to state
> > that names (as part/fragment of one Expression) could be meaningful
> > (references).
> >
> >       Patrick Wilson shows an example where the main subject (aboutness)
> > of one Work is not a specific case of a reference.
> >
> > ///////////////// start of Patrick Wilson quote (Two Kinds of Power,
> > 1968, p. 85)
> > Consider a particularly simple sort of case, that of a biographical
> > writing. A person's life can be divided into temporal segments (the first
> > five years, the next five, and so on) and into strands (professional life,
> > sexual life, and so on); the events of a life can be grouped variously into
> > segments and strands picked out in a multitude of ways. It is easily seen
> > that a writing said to be on the subject of the political career of a
> > certain man might contain no occurrence of the words "political career" or
> > any equivalent expression, and that there might be no reference to that
> > strand of his life at all.
> > ///////////////// end of Patrick Wilson quote
> >
> >
> > Regarding (c):
> > ==========
> >        After the creation of "Fnn Self Contained Individual Work" class
> > to represent the "E89 Propositional Object with a structural part of it that
> > is by itself an instance of E89 Propositional Object" in this proposal, I
> > think that the R5 and R15 properties could be considered as specific cases
> > of P106.
> >
> > Best Regards,
> >
> > Joao Lima
> >
> >
> >   On Thu, Apr 24, 2008 at 1:29 PM, martin <martin at ics.forth.gr> wrote:
> >
> > > Dear All,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > To be discussed.
> > >
> > > Martin
> > >
> > >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Crm-sig mailing list
> > Crm-sig at ics.forth.gr
> > http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig
> >
> >
>
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