[Crm-sig] Issue: E89 Propositional Object and Symbolic Object

João Oliveira joaoli13 at gmail.com
Sat Apr 26 00:09:34 EEST 2008


Dear Martin,

    Attached my contribution to the Propositional Object and Symbolic Object
discussion.

    I've created a modified version {Slide 4} of your graph.
    Basically, the differences could be summarized as:

  (a) A new property definition:
         [ E89 Propositional Object ] Rxx is realized in (realizes) [ E90
Symbolic Object ]
      with quantification '(1,1:1,1) necessary dependent';
  (a.1) A new subproperty definition:
         [ R15 is realized in (realizes) ] isA [ Rxx is realized in
(realizes)];
  (a.2) Exclusion of one E89 subclass declaration:
         [ E73 Information Object ] isA [ E89 Propositional Object];
  (a.3) A new class definition: "Fnn Self Contained Individual Work"
  (a.3.1) A new subproperty definition: [ F15 Individual Work ] Ryy has
component (is component of) [ Fnn Self Contained Individual Work ].

  (b) Exclusion of one subproperty declaration:
         [ P129 is about (is subject of) ] isA [ P67 refers to (is referred
to by) ];
  (b.1) Modification of P67 property domain:
         from [ E89 Propositional Object ] to [ E90 Symbolic Object ];

  (c) Modification of R5 superproperty:
        from [ P148 has component (is component of) ]
        to [ P106 is composed of (forms parts of) ]

Regarding (a), (a.1), (a.2), (a.3) and (a.3.1):
===============================
    The idea to define a "realizes" property between propositional and
symbolic objects and to remove the subclass declaration between "E73
Information Object" and "E89 Propositional Object" are based on Theory of
Concept (Ingetraut Dahlberg, 1978), on Smiraglia's analogy of Works and Sign
(Semiotic), and on the R15 property definition of FRBRoo.

    To Dahlberg, a concept (that could represent universals and individuals)
has three components {ppt file - Slide 1}:
(1) the Item of Reference (IR);
(2) the set of true predications about IR;
(3) and the synthesis of "true predications about IR" by a term/a name.

    In CIDOC CRM terms, we could make an analogy as: E1 Entity (as IR); E89
Propositional Object (as set of true predications about IR); and E90
Symbolic Object (as the synthesis of "true predications about IR" by a
term/a name) {ppt file - Slide 2}.

    An example that relates instances of "E31 Document", "F15 Individual
Work" and "F22 Self Contained Expression " classes is presented at { Slide 3
}.
    This analogy between Work and Dalhberg's Concept definition is similar
to the analogy of Work and Sign (Semiotic) that was realized by Smiraglia in
the paper "Musical Works as Information Retrieval Entities: Epistemological
Perspectives"):

////////////// start of Smiraglia's quote
"A work is a signifying, concrete set of ideational conceptions that finds
realization through semantic or symbolic expression. That is, a work
embraces a set of ideas that constitute both the conceptual (signified) and
image (signifier) components of a sign. A work functions in society in the
same manner that a sign functions in language. Works, like signs,
demonstrate the characteristics of arbitrariness (the absence of a natural
link between the signified and the signifier) and linearity (signifiers
unfold sequentially over time). Therefore, works are subject to the natural
ambiguity of signs, having
both the properties of immutability (the fixed nature of a signifier in a
given community) and mutability (change over time in their perception and
use)."
////////////// end of Smiraglia's quote


Regarding (b, and b.1):
=================

     To justify the modifications (b) and (b.1), I'll make argumetations
based on Wittgenstein (First W. - in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) TLP
propositions and I'll show one example of Patrick Wilson's "Two Kinds of
Power" about "aboutness" and "reference".
     In the (First) Wittgenstein we can find the following propositions
about proposition, expression, names and sense.

/////////////// start of Wittgenstein's quote
(3)    A logical picture of facts is a thought.
(3.1)  In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived
by the senses.
(3.11) We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written,
etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is
to think of the sense of proposition.
(3.142) Only fact can express a sense, a set of names cannot.
(3.143) Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obscured by the
usual form of expression in writing or print. For in a printed proposition,
for example, no essential difference is apparent between a propositional
sign and a word.
(3.144) Situations can be described but not given names. (Names are like
points; propositions like arrows - they have sense)
(3.3)  Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does
a name have meaning",
(3.4)  A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of
this logical place is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents -
by the existence of the proposition with a sense."
/////////////// end of Wittgenstein's quote
      Different from Frege, Wittgenstein consider that names don't express
sense (3.142) and  only "in the nexus of a proposition does a name have
meaning" (3.3). It's important to perceive that meaning is different from
sense ( 3.144 ... "Names are like points; propositions like arrows - they
have sense").

    In FRBRoo terms, I think that F2 Expression (like a symbolic object)
doesn't have sense (aboutness, intentionality). But it's possible to state
that names (as part/fragment of one Expression) could be meaningful
(references).

      Patrick Wilson shows an example where the main subject (aboutness) of
one Work is not a specific case of a reference.

///////////////// start of Patrick Wilson quote (Two Kinds of Power, 1968,
p. 85)
Consider a particularly simple sort of case, that of a biographical writing.
A person's life can be divided into temporal segments (the first five years,
the next five, and so on) and into strands (professional life, sexual life,
and so on); the events of a life can be grouped variously into segments and
strands picked out in a multitude of ways. It is easily seen that a writing
said to be on the subject of the political career of a certain man might
contain no occurrence of the words "political career" or any equivalent
expression, and that there might be no reference to that strand of his life
at all.
///////////////// end of Patrick Wilson quote


Regarding (c):
==========
       After the creation of "Fnn Self Contained Individual Work" class to
represent the "E89 Propositional Object with a structural part of it that is
by itself an instance of E89 Propositional Object" in this proposal, I think
that the R5 and R15 properties could be considered as specific cases of
P106.

Best Regards,

Joao Lima



On Thu, Apr 24, 2008 at 1:29 PM, martin <martin at ics.forth.gr> wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> Attached my latest attempt for Propositional Object and Symbolic Object.
> I have revised the scope note for E89 slightly: Propositional Objects may
> or may not have a literary subject. Anything that has a literay subject
> must be a Propositional Object.
>
> I have adjusted the properties respectively. Attached the graph of the
> Conceptual Object redesign.
>
> The question is, if P106 should be redefined as done here from structural
> to
> symbolic, or a new property for symbolic decomposition should be declared.
> Then, P106 would be subproperty of both, P148 and P106, since any
> conceptual
> decomposition would imply a symbolic decomposition.
>
> To be discussed.
>
> Martin
> --
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------
>  Dr. Martin Doerr              |  Vox:+30(2810)391625        |
>  Principle Researcher          |  Fax:+30(2810)391638        |
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