RE [crm-sig] Have endurance!

Nicholas.Crofts at Nicholas.Crofts at
Thu Mar 31 18:07:30 EEST 2005

Dear All,

Great paper this, but it seems to be based on a distinction that is not the
same as the one used in the CRM between perdurant and endurant entities.
The two positions being described - the endurance theory and the perdurance
theory, are seen as being in conflict. Both are attempts to describe the
nature of persistence. Briefly put, endurance is the "common-sense" view
that the identity of an object remains fundamentally unchanged over time,
whereas the perdurance view is that persistant identity is an illusion
created by summing together a succession of temporal instants - existance
is like a series of frames from a moving film. (I suppose that one could
trace this debate back to Herclates originally.)

Incidentally, the text of the ISO version of the CRM deliberately
plays-down the perdurant /endurant terminology in a blatant attempt to
side-step the issue ;-)



             <martin at ics.forth                                             
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                                       [crm-sig] Have endurance!           
             31.03.2005 15:37                                              

Dear All,

My colleague Athina Kritsotakh has gathered the following references to
endurants and perdurants.
Enjoy. If you have more, please send me.



Endurants and perdurants

Love, Shanon. 2001. The Ontology of Persistence: (a master thesis )

In 1986, David Lewis offered what he thought would be the decisive
objection against endurantism, showing it to be an implausible theory.
The problem of temporary intrinsics stated that an object cannot have two
complementary intrinsic properties while maintaining identity, as
endurantists claim. Perdurantism, then, must be the more plausible theory,
according to Lewis. The endurantists responded to this objection
by formulating different versions of endurantism designed to avoid the
problem. Subsequently, the endurantist tried to undermine the
perdurantist position by arguing that a perduring object cannot undergo
what is considered to be genuine change. As a result, endurantism is
the more plausible theory. However, the perdurantist can show that
endurantism seems to fail to provide an account of change as well. In
what follows, I argue that the implicit ontological commitments of the
endurantists and perdurantists have prevented the problem of
temporary intrinsics and change from resolving the endurantist/perdurantist
debate. I offer examples of plausible ontologies for the
endurantist and perdurantist in order to emphasize this problem. I will
argue that, in order to resolve the debate, one must ultimately
examine the ontological accounts of each theory.

Teller P.  2002. The rotating disk argument and Humean supervenience:
cutting the Gordian knot. Analysis July 2002, vol. 62, no. 275,  pp.

McKinnon N. 2002. The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction.  Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, September 01, 2002, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 288-306(19)


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